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Abstract:
A leading cause of security breaches is a basic human vulnerability: our susceptibility to deception. Hackers exploit this
vulnerability by sending phishing emails that induce users to click on malicious links that then download malware or trick
the victim into revealing personal confidential information to the hacker. Past research has focused on human
susceptibility to generic phishing emails or individually targeted spear-phishing emails. This study addresses how
contextualization of phishing emails for targeted groups impacts their susceptibility to phishing. We manipulated the
framing and content of email messages and tested the effects on users’ susceptibility to phishing. We constructed
phishing emails to elicit either the fear of losing something valuable (e.g., course registrations, tuition assistance) or the
anticipation of gaining something desirable (e.g., iPad, gift card, social networks). We designed the emails’ context to
manipulate human psychological weaknesses such as greed, social needs, and so on. We sent fictitious (benign) emails
to 7,225 undergraduate students and recorded their responses. Results revealed that contextualizing messages to
appeal to recipients’ psychological weaknesses increased their susceptibility to phishing. The fear of losing or
anticipation of gaining something valuable increased susceptibility to deception and vulnerability to phishing. The results
of our study provide important contributions to information security research, including a theoretical framework based
on the heuristic-systematic processing model to study the susceptibility of users to deception. We demonstrate through
our experiment that several situational factors do, in fact, alter the effectiveness of phishing attempts.
Keywords: Phishing, Information Security, Social Engineering, Behavioral Security, Heuristic-Systematic Processing
Model, Deception, Cognitive Biases, Vulnerabilities, Security Risk, Threats.
Mikko Siponen was the accepting senior editor. This article was submitted on June 2, 2014 and went through three revisions.
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Introduction

Social engineering attacks, largely orchestrated through phishing messages, remain a persistent threat that
allows hackers to circumvent security controls (Aaron & Rasmussen, 2015). One can manipulate people
into revealing confidential information by exploiting their habits, motives, and cognitive biases (Mitnick &
Simon, 2002). Countering these characteristics to prevent users from succumbing to phishing emails
remains an important research problem that will have a strong impact on information security.
Early research on phishing focused on users’ ability to detect structural and physical cues in malicious
emails, such as spelling mistakes and differences between the displayed URL and the URL embedded in
the HTML code (Jakobsson & Ratkiewicz, 2006). More recent work has focused on cognitive limitations that
prevent users from distinguishing between fraudulent and legitimate messages (Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst,
2006; Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006). People often process email messages quickly by using mental
models or heuristics and, hence, overlook cues that indicate deception (Luo, Zhang, Burd, & Seazzu, 2013).
In addition, people’s habits, needs, and desires make them vulnerable to phishing scams (Workman, 2007).
Watters (2009) concludes that phishing messages elicit automatic modes of response based on structural
cues rather than careful deliberation using cognitive processing. If the message suggests it will fulfill, or
threaten, important needs, the reader may overlook cues that indicate deception.
Awareness of phishing messages among users has increased, but so has the sophistication of these
messages (Jagatic, Johnson, Jacobsson, & Menczer, 2007). Hackers design phishing messages today to
affect basic human emotions (e.g., fear, greed, and altruism) and often target specific groups to exploit their
specific needs. Hackers sometimes even contextualize the messages to individuals by incorporating their
personal information (spear phishing). For instance, a new phishing scam has arisen on dating applications;
a user (bot) triggers a conversation with another user (victim) and, after a few exchanges, sends a link
(malicious) to the victim ostensibly with a picture in an attempt to get the victim to click on it (Jones, 2015).
Research shows that spear phishing is more effective than broad phishing messages, which target a wider
population (e.g., Wang, Herath, Chen, Vishwanath & Rao, 2012), but few, if any, studies have compared
the relative effectiveness of messages contextualized to elicit different emotions in users. We designed our
study to fill this gap in the literature.
In this paper, we consider different cognitive biases that inveigle users to click on phishing messages. We
focus on the content and framing of these messages and identify the types of messages most likely to
deceive users. Specifically, we examine the effectiveness of different contextualized messages designed to
exploit basic human emotions and desires. Research in cognitive neuroscience shows that emotions play
an important role in decision making by subconsciously steering people toward gains and away from losses
(Damasio, 1994). A carefully constructed phishing email may activate basic emotions that nudge people to
comply with the disguised malicious request. For example, fear stems from the perception of threat to one’s
wellbeing and acts as a warning signal for forthcoming harm (LeDoux, 2003). Fear increases immediate
precautionary action to protect oneself and one’s possessions (Leventhal, 1970). A typical banking scam
exploits fear reactions by suggesting that users will have their account blocked unless they change their
credentials by clicking on a Web link. The fear of losing something valuable might result in users divulging
their credentials to the hacker (Kim & Kim, 2013). Greed is another emotion that hackers who craft phishing
emails often exploit (Hong, 2012). The infamous “Nigerian Prince” scam capitalizes on the allure of easy
money to deceive and cheat its victims. Coupling greed with scarcity, such as “only a few laptops left” or
“the first two hundred respondents are eligible”, may establish a sense of urgency (or a fear of losing out)
that increases the perceived value of the object (Cialdini, 1993) and may can cloud rational judgment even
more (Hong, 2012).
Of course, phishing attacks can manipulate many other emotions and related psychological traits, such as
curiosity, anger, patriotism, friendship, altruism, vanity, authority, community belongingness, and sense of
duty. In this study, we examine how the framing of message content affects susceptibility to phishing
attempts. We manipulate fraudulent email messages to appeal to different desires or needs and
contextualize the messages by framing them as either potential gains or losses. We tested the effectiveness
of the different messages in a naturalistic setting using college students. The research design also allowed
us to examine differences in susceptibility among different subgroups (e.g., males vs. females; academic
major).
This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we discuss the extant literature. In Section 3, we discuss the
theoretical basis for our research and our hypotheses. In Section 4, we present the research design and
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review the experimental methodology. In Section 5, we present the experimental results. In Section 6, we
discuss the results in detail and present the study’s implications and limitations. Finally, in Section 7, we
conclude the paper.

2

Literature Review

Phishing’s foundations lie in human decision making where one persuades someone else to make nonrational instinctive and emotional choices rather than more deliberative and logical choices—in this case,
on clicking malicious links. Anderson and Moore (2009) emphasize that heuristics and biases drive decision
making, especially when the user is emotionally aroused and in unusual conditions. The research on
phishing correspondingly focuses on understanding the triggers for non-rational decisions and aims to steer
users towards more deliberative and rational choices. A large fraction of phishing research involves testing
users’ susceptibility to phishing when faced with different scenarios and evaluating the impact of
interventions on reducing this susceptibility as we discuss further in the literature review. One can broadly
classify phishing research into two categories: 1) susceptibility to phishing, including psychological factors,
individual differences (e.g., cognitive limitations, personality traits, identity, and demographics), and
structural features of the messages (e.g., presence of misspelling); and 2) solutions to reduce susceptibility
to phishing (e.g., toolbars and training). Subsequently, we summarize the literature and lay out the
motivation for our research in the following subsections.

2.1

Susceptibility to Phishing

Psychological factors are at the core of human vulnerability to deception, and some exploratory work has
focused on ascertaining these factors as they relate to phishing. The factors that this research has examined
include cognitive limitations, familiarity, emotional arousal, social psychological factors (e.g., trust, fear, and
commitment), personal relationships, personality traits (e.g., neuroticism, extroversion, and openness), and
demographic variables. We discuss this research in three segments (i.e., psychological triggers, individual
differences, and visual/structural cues).

2.1.1

Psychological Triggers for Phishing

Extant literature has attributed phishing susceptibility to human cognitive limitations and psychological
manipulation of victims as we discuss further in this section. Dhamija et al. (2006) discuss human cognitive
limitations in being able to detect fraudulent messages. They identify five broad categories of strategies that
users employ to identify fraudulent websites based on content, URL analysis, URL protocol (i.e., https), and
other visual security cues such as use of HTTPs, bar padlocks, and security certificates. All of the subjects
in the study performed at a 40 percent error rate, and the authors found no statistically significant difference
between the methods the participants used to identify fraudulent websites.
Downs et al. (2006) investigated the impact of risk familiarity in informing phishing defense strategies. They
provided fake identities to twenty subjects and asked them to roleplay email and Web interactions. They
found that, when users were exposed to specific scams and could comprehend their modalities, they could
protect themselves. However, participants could not defend themselves when exposed to deception that
was sophisticated or novel. These results suggest that heuristics that many increase one’s susceptibility to
phishing scams guide individuals’ responses to email requests (e.g., “Amazon is a reputable company, and
I may have already given them the information they are asking for; therefore, I would be comfortable giving
the information to them again.”).
Workman (2008) investigated whether the factors that result in successful marketing campaigns also affect
the success of social engineering attacks such as phishing and pretexting. He reviewed the literature on
security, management, and social psychology and highlighted important factors that may impact the success
of social engineering attacks: trust, fear, commitment, and reactance. He examined the relation between
these factors and employee susceptibility to social engineering attacks and found a strong positive
correlation of social engineering with trust, fear, and commitment—both for self-reported and observed
behavior.
Some work has focused specifically on spear-phishing attacks; that is, phishing emails customized to a
specific individual or organization rather than to a specific demographic (students, elderly, women, etc.) or
the general population at large. Jagatic et al. (2007) examined whether email senders’ personal
relationships altered the recipient’s susceptibility to phishing attacks. They sent (benign) phishing messages
to university students that appeared to come from friends of the subjects using data mined from their profiles
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online social networks. The manipulated messages produced an 80 percent susceptibility rate compared to
only 16 percent for the control group, suggesting that people are more likely to be deceived if messages
appear to come from someone in their social network. The study identified the gender of the user (recipient)
from their Facebook profile and found that the sender’s gender did not have an independent effect on
susceptibility. Halevi, Lewis, and Nov (2015) found that 25 of 40 employees (62.5%) clicked on a link
embedded in a fraudulent email purportedly from the company’s IT manager and addressed to them
individually. Egelman, Cranor, and Hong (2008) tested the effectiveness of security warnings by simulating
spear-phishing attacks that exposed users to such warnings. They found out that the participants were
susceptible to spear-phishing emails and that active phishing warnings demonstrated greater protection
against spear phishing.
Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, and McCormac (2015) conducted a phishing experiment to examine how
phishing messages created using three social engineering strategies (authority, scarcity, and social proof)
influenced users' judgments of how safe a link is in an email. Their experiment included genuine, phishing,
or spear-phishing messages. They found that content based on authority was the most effective strategy in
convincing users that the link was safe while social proof was the least effective. Also, 71 percent of
participants had difficulty distinguishing between genuine and spear-phishing emails and fell prey to
phishing emails. Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, and Marett (2014) used principles of persuasion to
design emails and test their efficacy in phishing susceptibility. They found that messages designed with
principles of persuasion were more effective; however, the efficacy of different principles varied.

2.1.2

Individual Differences in Susceptibility to Phishing

Different individuals have a different propensity to becoming victims of phishing attacks based on behavioral
traits, demographic characteristics, personality, and habituation; we discuss these individual differences in
this section. Moody, Galletta, Walker, and Dunn (2011) extensively investigated individual differences in
susceptibility to phishing. They examined disposition to trust and distrust, curiosity, entertainment drive,
boredom proneness, lack of focus, risk propensity, and level of Internet usage, attachment to the Internet,
and Internet anxiety as the traits related to susceptibility. They found that several of the traits were good
indicators of susceptibility to phishing, most notably trust, curiosity, boredom proneness, and risk propensity.
Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, and Downs (2010) focused on demographic characteristics (gender,
age, and education level) as predictors of phishing susceptibility. They found that women were more
susceptible to phishing than men and that the 18- to 25-year-old individuals formed the most susceptible
age group. Flores, Holm, Nohlberg, and Ekstedt (2015) examined cultural differences and personal
determinants (e.g., intention to resist social engineering, security awareness, and training) of phishing. In
contrast to Sheng et al. (2010), they did not find a significant correlation between phishing behavior and age
or gender in their study. They found significant positive correlations between employees’ observed phishing
behavior and intention, security awareness, and training; however, the strength of correlations differed
across different cultures (i.e., US, India, and Sweden). Correlations of both intention and security awareness
to phishing behavior were not significant for American and Indian individuals but were for Swedish
individuals. The correlation between training and phishing behavior was stronger for the American
individuals compared to Swedish individuals and non-significant for Indian individuals.
Halevi, Lewis, and Memon (2013) used the five-factor model of personality to examine the relation between
personality and vulnerability to phishing. The five behavior traits in this model are neuroticism, extroversion,
openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. The authors sent a sample of 100 college students (83%
male; ages 17-21) (benign) phishing emails with a malicious link. Specifically, they sent the sample an email
that promised a prize of an Apple product to test the individuals’ susceptibility to phishing, and the authors
considered that they had phished the participants if they clicked on the embedded link. Results showed that
females were significantly more likely to be “phished” than men and that students high in neuroticism were
more susceptible to the phishing attacks. While interesting, the research does not delve into the
psychological reasons of the susceptibility or compare different motivators in susceptibility to phishing.
Vishwanath (2015) investigated the role of habit and cognitive processing in victimization to phishing. He
sent 200 randomly selected students a phishing email with an attached survey. He obtained measures of
the subjects’ level of heuristic and systematic processing, information sufficiency, and personality traits. He
hypothesized that systematic (as opposed to heuristic) processing of data would result in lower incidence
of phishing victimization. He found that students with low emotional stability had impulsive email habits such
as reactively checking email and responding to email notifications and were more likely to click on phishing
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email links. We elaborate further on systematic and heuristic processing in our theoretical development in
Section 3.

2.1.3

Physical Attributes of Messages in Susceptibility to Phishing

Some research has investigated the impact of phishing emails’ physical features on users’ susceptibility to
phishing. For instance, Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz (2006) sent phishing emails with links crafted to look
suspicious (e.g., spelling mistakes, escape characters, and naked IP addresses in the URL) and found that
four to 14 percent of users still clicked on those links. In a different study, Jakobsson, Tsow, Shah, Blevis,
and Lim (2007) examined the effectiveness of trust indicators in email and webpages wherein they asked
users to identify features that provoked trust. Their findings indicated that 1) sophisticated layout and legal
disclaimers engender trust (e.g., copyright notices), 2) too much emphasis on security is counterproductive,
3) individuals use URLs extensively to evaluate trust, and 4) the impact of third party endorsement varies
by whether one recognizes the party’s name.
Wang et al. (2012) studied how users process visual cues and detection indicators of phishing messages
and decision making process. They found that attention to visceral triggers and phishing detection indicators
and to users’ phishing knowledge played a critical role in phishing detection. Harrison, Vishwanath, Ng, and
Rao (2015) found that information that alludes to social presence fosters heuristic decision making and
increases susceptibility to phishing. The authors manipulated social presence with cues such as the
university logo, versing security logo, and click-to-chat icons.

2.2

Countering Phishing Messages

Some research has examined the impact of training users in recognizing features in phishing messages to
reduce susceptibility to phishing; however, most research has primarily focused on susceptibility to phishing.
We have some evidence that educating individuals about common phishing practices reduces their
likelihood of being phished (Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Mather, 2009a; Kumaraguru et al., 2009b; Sheng et al.,
2010); however, results regarding the efficacy of training have been generally disappointing (Görling, 2006).
Anandpara, Dingman, Jakobsson, Liu, and Roinestad (2007) contend that training individuals with phishing
IQ tests is ineffective at improving susceptibility because it simply raises fears related to phishing rather
than making users better at discerning whether an email is phishing them or not. Still others believe that the
effects of such training are short term (Caputo, Pfleeger, Freeman, & Johnson, 2014). There are, however,
innovative ways in which one can make phishing education effective. Kumaraguru et al. (2007) and Sheng
et al. (2007) demonstrate the use of innovative learning designs based on learning science principles for
anti-phishing education. Mayhorn and Nyeste (2012) show that training through comic strips and video
games is very effective at reducing vulnerability to social engineering. Arachchilage and Love (2013) show
that a game design framework for avoiding phishing attacks is very effective.
In addition to training, researchers have developed other various anti-phishing solutions to reduce
individuals’ susceptibility to phishing attacks (Emigh, 2005), such as toolbars, browser add-ons, and
indicators (e.g., Netcraft and Web of Trust). Dhamija and Tygar (2005) propose an authentication scheme
named Dynamic Security Skins that allows users to distinguish “spoofed” webpages using a unique image
for each transaction. The scheme displays the image as a “skin” on the transaction window so that the user
can verify that the images match and authenticate the content generated by the server. Wu, Miller, and
Garfinkel (2006) evaluate the effectiveness of security toolbars as a deterrent to phishing. They conducted
a study in which they required participants to respond to twenty emails, five of which were phishing
manipulations. They found 33-45 percent incidence of clicking on phishing emails when toolbars were
allowed. They also found that providing pop-up blocking warnings reduced the rates, but 70 percent of
participants still succumbed to at least one deceptive email.

2.3

Summary of Prior Research

As we can see, the research suggests that psychological factors such as trust, fear, and obedience to
authority may increase susceptibility to phishing. Most published studies have focused on users’
susceptibility to generic phishing messages without contextualization. Contextualizing messages may
increase the effectiveness of phishing, which the recent studies on spear phishing evidence. However, one
may not need to personalize phishing messages to be effective; messages designed for a particular group
of people may be effective if they identify group-relevant concerns and elicit specific emotions that trigger
the desired response. To date, few studies have experimentally investigated the effects of contextualization
or directly compared different contextualized messages. As such, we test the effectiveness of contextualized
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messages designed to elicit different emotions in a targeted population (students). We also adopt a
theoretical framework that explains how contextualized messages may increase users’ susceptibility to
phishing by causing them to make hasty judgments based on initial impressions of the immediate context
but also stand up to scrutiny should the users consider the message more carefully.

3

Theoretical Foundations

The considerable research attention that has focused on phishing susceptibility lately lacks an integrating
theory. We draw on theories from social and cognitive psychology to provide the conceptual framework for
our research. Our basic premise is that successful phishing attacks take advantage of the human tendency
to make quick and intuitive judgments based on initial impressions of the immediate context. Although
phishing messages contain false information that one may detect with careful scrutiny or investigation, a
well-crafted message activates specific motives that push victims toward accepting the message.
Contemporary theories of information processing propose that two modes of processing exist: one quick
and intuitive and one slow and deliberate. For example, Kahneman (2011) distinguishes between 1) an
automatic and quick mode of thinking designed to detect simple relationships and to integrate information
to maintain and update perceptions of our world (system 1) and 2) a slower, deliberate mode of thinking
associated with the subjective experiences of agency, choice, and concentration (system 2). Whereas
system 1 is a “machine for jumping to conclusions”, system 2 allocates attention to effortful mental activities
and can compare objects on several attributes, follow rules, and make choices. Similarly, Petty and
Cacciopo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model (ELM) of persuasion identifies two cognitive processing
routes to persuasion: a central and a peripheral path. The peripheral path is characterized by limited
conscious attention that relies on cues and mental shortcuts that bypass counter-argumentation, whereas
the central route relies on rational analysis that involves elaborating on information and arguments. When
processing information peripherally, people do not think carefully about the content of the message; instead,
they are influenced by superficial factors surrounding the communication. Phishing attempts often capitalize
on peripheral routes to persuasion by incorporating cues that provoke action without careful deliberation.
Such superficial features that often produce action are cues related to authority, scarcity or urgency,
reciprocity, and similarity. In a phishing context, individuals will likely process emails from purported authority
figures (e.g., bank officials and school administrators) that stress urgent action or evoke feelings of
reciprocity along the peripheral path and, thus, lead to action without the user’s carefully considering the
request. Both Kahneman’s theory and Petty and Cacciopo’s ELM predict that successful phishing attempts
work by pushing or nudging users to divulge information without provoking excessive thought.
Although quickly or peripherally processing information may increase the likelihood of deception, it does not
sufficiently explain victimization. One cannot describe people victimized by the Nigerian Prince scam, for
example, as always operating in a peripheral or quick thinking mode. Rather, the two modes of processing
may occur simultaneously, and some successful phishing attempts capitalize on both systems. The
heuristic-systematic processing model (HSM) (Chaiken, 1987; Chen & Chaiken, 1999) provides a strong
conceptual basis for understanding how this processing may occur. According to HSM, people use a
combination of heuristic (quick) and systematic (deliberate) processing modes to reach judgments. Heuristic
processing refers to relying on judgmental rules and cognitive shortcuts (heuristics). It is associated with
rapid decisions that individuals often base on immediate emotion and is subject to cognitive biases.
Systematic processing involves carefully scrutinizing information and refers to analytically and
comprehensively dealing with messages. HSM invokes the principle of least effort; that is, people tend to
choose the course of action that requires the least effort, and, thus, heuristic processing often takes
precedence over more effortful systematic processing (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). But heuristic processing
does not mean that people ignore motivational concerns. Rather, people sense motivational concerns in the
immediate context and then try to spend minimal cognitive effort meeting those immediate motivational
concerns. A critical concept in HSM is the notion of a sufficiency threshold, which refers to a desired level
of confidence that people have for their judgments (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Confidence in one’s decision
or judgment must pass this threshold level; according to HSM, people will continue processing the message
until they are confident that they have surpassed the sufficiency threshold. If people can reach the
sufficiency threshold with heuristic processing, then they stop processing information. Otherwise, they are
likely to use systematic processing until they reach the sufficiency threshold. The HSM also proposes that
one can adjust the sufficiency threshold up or down depending on contextual factors, such as how important
the decision is, or how much time pressure one is under. When pressed to make a decision quickly, for
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example, people may lower their sufficiency threshold, which makes it easier to reach with heuristic
processing alone.
Luo et al. (2013) applied HSM to phishing attacks to outline the anatomy of a successful attack. They argue
that successful phishing attacks increase individuals’ heuristic processing and suppress their systematic
processing. Attackers can do so by luring recipients to quickly but inaccurately assess the validity of the
message or by reducing the sufficiency threshold so that recipients do not initiate systematic processing. If,
however, the recipient fails to remain in heuristic processing mode, the successful (phishing) message is
also one built to “withstand” systematic processing, such that, even if recipients scrutinize the message
more carefully, they still make an inaccurate assessment of its validity. As Luo et al. (2013) summarize,
heuristic and systematic processing may produce the same conclusion and, thereby, increase one’s
confidence in the judgment. Heuristic processing may create an initial impression that systematic processing
subsequently confirms (i.e., a confirmation bias; Kahneman, 2011).
Luo et al.’s (2013) framework suggests that research should focus on factors that: 1) increase the likelihood
that recipients will rely on heuristic processing; 2) lower the sufficiency threshold; and/or 3) increase the
chances that a message will stand up to scrutiny. We argue that contextualizing an email message to quickly
trigger motivational concerns in a context that appears specific to the recipient lowers the sufficiency
threshold and helps the message withstand scrutiny should heuristic processing give way to more
systematic processing. For example, course registrations are important to college students, and a message
that threatens their continuance is likely to create a sense of urgency and the need for quick action. A strong
emotion such as fear of losing something of value may subconsciously predispose or push people toward
action (Damasio, 1994). As a result, students may quickly respond to a request for personal information in
order to secure their courses. In this sense, contextualization acts like pretexting in social engineering
attacks. In pretexting, one invents a scenario and incorporates something of specific relevance or
importance to the recipient in the scenario, which acts to legitimize the interaction and can induce the
recipient to divulge information (Anderson, 2010; Luo et al., 2013). One can also see contextualization as a
form of spear phishing, where the attacker targets specific individuals with personalized messages.
Typically, spear-phishing victims receive an email that appears to be from someone they know, which
increases their trust in the message. In both pretexting and spear phishing, a carefully manipulated context
underscores the importance of immediate action, which may simultaneously encourage heuristic
processing, increase trust, and lower the sufficiency threshold and, thereby, obviate the need for careful
scrutiny of the message.
H1:

Contextualized email messages that relate to a recipient’s specific concerns increase
susceptibility to phishing compared to non-contextualized emails that relate to general or broad
concerns.

Another factor that is likely to influence the sufficiency threshold and susceptibility to deception is whether
the message is framed to suggest that the recipient gains or loses something of value. People are motivated
to gain things of value, and they may be induced to divulge personal information with the allure of money or
material goods. However, research associated with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests
that potential losses exert a stronger influence over people’s judgments and actions than potential gains.
Prospect theory is a descriptive theory of decision making under uncertainty that explains when people will
be seek or avoid risk. A key principle of prospect theory is that the way in which people frame an outcome
affects their actions. Two key concepts influence judgments: reference dependence and loss aversion.
Reference dependence refers to the fact that individuals evaluate decision outcomes relative to a reference
point, often the status quo. Individuals see outcomes above the reference point as gains and outcomes
below the reference point are as losses. People attach subjective values to gains and losses, such that
gains are associated with positive value and losses with negative value. People are maximally sensitive to
change near the reference point (greater value attached to amount of change from status quo), and
individuals weigh losses more heavily than gains. That is, the pain of losing $100 is greater than the joy of
gaining $100. Prospect theory has two important implications for phishing. First, a phishing message crafted
to induce an immediate sense of change from the status quo (either in terms of gaining something desired,
such as a free gift card, or in terms of preventing the loss of something desired, such as money) will more
likely deceive people. Second, the threat of an immediate loss is particularly likely to spur people to action.
The negative value associated with loss may lower the sensitivity threshold and produce the belief that quick
compliance with the email request will prevent the loss. Thus, messages that threaten the loss of something
valuable may be more effective than messages offering the possibility of gain.
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H2:

Phishing messages that frame potential outcomes as losses are more effective than messages
that frame outcomes as gains.

The types of motives and emotions elicited in the recipient may also influence a phishing message’s
effectiveness. Few studies have examined the motives that phishing messages elicit despite Downs et al.’s
(2006) finding suggesting that emails’ content is more likely to influence the judged trustworthiness of an
email than peripheral cues in headers and subject lines. Drawing on work in evolutionary and social
psychology, Lawrence and Nohria (2002) identified four broad, universal motivational drives or “emotional
needs” in humans: 1) the drive to acquire, 2) the drive to defend, 3) the drive to bond, and 4) the drive to
learn. The drive to acquire relates to the motivation to secure scarce goods for oneself, including intangibles
such as social status. One can see achievement and power motives, along with emotions of greed and
envy, as manifestations of the drive to acquire. The drive to defend refers to the motivation to protect oneself,
one’s family, and one’s possessions against external threats (physical and psychological). Fear of losing
something of value triggers the drive to defend. The drive to bond relates to the pervasive drive to form and
maintain lasting, positive interpersonal relationships. Humans desire social connections and, thus, are
motivated to join and remain in groups. The drive to learn refers to the motivation to satisfy our curiosity and
master our environments. Deceptive content that activates one of these basic emotional needs or drives will
most likely to deceive recipients and convince them to divulge personal or sensitive information. In this
study, we manipulate the content of phishing emails to activate the first three drives; that is, to acquire, to
defend, and to connect. Although these drives are universal, the context in which they operate may vary.
For example, face-to-face interactions with others may activate, for example, the drive to bond more easily
than asynchronous email communications. However, email communications that identify a path or
mechanism for obtaining valued tangible or intangible outcomes may more easily activate the drive to
acquire. Thus, we might expect that the motive to acquire, along with associated emotions such as greed,
will lower the sufficiency threshold and make people more susceptible to phishing.
H3:

4

Phishing messages that offer recipients the opportunity to acquire new outcomes (tangible or
intangible) are associated with greater susceptibility than messages associated with social
outcomes.

Research Design

Finn and Jakobsson (2007) discuss ethical and technical issues regarding phishing experiments. They
define three principal approaches that researchers have used to quantify responses to phishing attacks:
surveys, closed-lab experiments, and imitation studies. Survey studies require participants to report their
own behaviors. One serious drawback of survey studies is that participants are apt to underestimate or
overestimate the possible damages of phishing attacks; they may not be aware of the phishing attack or
may not be willing to disclose that they have fallen prey to a phishing attack. Closed-lab experiments allow
researchers to evaluate phishing attacks and their countermeasures in a controlled environment, but, at the
same time, the participants of such experiments might be biased because they are aware that they are part
of an experiment. The third strategy uses deception and imitates real phishing attacks to measure the actual
success rate of these attacks under realistic (albeit ultimately benign) conditions. Although the imitation
approach is the most realistic research strategy, it possesses ethical concerns because mimicking a
phishing attack involves deception and, hence, poses risk of psychological harm or negative reactions in
participants. We used the imitation strategy to measure actual behaviors as realistically as possible.
However, we included an informational page in the follow-up survey that explained the purpose of the study
and how phishing works and provided participants advice about how to avoid phishing attempts (Appendix
2).
Phishing involves multiple discrete steps that culminate with the user’s revealing confidential information to
the hacker. The first step is the deception, whereby the victim receives a phishing email, reads the email,
and is motivated to react. The second step involves the user’s clicking on the link to the phishing webpage
and evaluating the information on the page. The third step involves further deception in that the user is
convinced to reveal personal information such as credit card number, social security number, or banking
information. The user does not necessarily need to follow through to step 3 for the hacker to breach their
security. Step 2, in which a user clicks on the fraudulent link, can result in the user’s downloading malware
to the user’s computer, which can cause damage to the computer or, worse yet, install a backdoor through
which the hacker can gain access to it. The key question that we address in this research is: what causes
people to be deceived by phishing messages, and what motivates them to click on phishing links?
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Specifically, we examine the first and second steps of the phishing process, and then, instead of having
users reveal their personal information, we direct participants to a benign website, inform them that they
have fallen prey to phishing, provide an educational message, and request that they voluntarily complete a
survey that assesses their security perceptions and personality traits.
We designed the emails’ content to test the hypothesized effects of gain/loss frame, contextualization, and
motive. We used positively and negatively framed messages to portray gains and losses, respectively.
Positively framed messages presented recipients with the opportunity to acquire something of value (e.g.,
gift card, iPad mini, computer virus software, and feelings of altruism). Negatively framed messages
threatened recipients with the loss of something of value (course registrations and money in bank accounts)
or the loss of a potentially valuable opportunity (opportunity for tuition assistance). We varied
contextualization in two ways. First, we varied outcomes so that they pertained specifically to students at
the university (e.g., course registrations and tuition assistance) or to any person (e.g., $50 gift card and iPad
mini). Second, we portrayed the message sender as being from in the university (e.g., student accounts
manager) or external to the university (e.g., the Apple research team). Finally, we intended the messages’
content to activate individuals’ motives to acquire things, protect assets, or connect to/help others. We
created eight messages, four with a “gain” frame and four with a “loss” frame. Table 1 summarizes the eight
emails.
Table 1. Characteristics of Phishing Emails
Content

Gain or loss

General motive

Contextualization

Gift Card
iPad Mini
Virus & firewall software
Volunteer
Course registration
Bank card
Tuition assistance
Alumni social network

Gain
Gain
Gain
Gain (altruism)
Loss
Loss
Loss (of opportunity)
Loss (of opportunity)

Acquisition
Acquisition
Defense
Social
Acquisition
Acquisition
Acquisition
Social

Low
Low
High
Low
High
High
High
High

The participants in the study were third- and fourth-year students enrolled at a large research university in
Northeastern USA. We used a university setting for this study because students frequently fall victim to
similar online threats (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) and because researchers consider them an appropriate
group for such applied behavioral research (Gordon, Slade, & Schmitt, 1986). They also fit in the age bracket
most susceptible to phishing. We categorized students into four groups according to their broad academic
major: social sciences, STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) fields, humanities, and
business. The total dataset included 7,225 students, with 3,513 females and 3,712 males. The breakdown
by major was as follows: social sciences: 1,791 females and 1,554 males; business: 340 females and 554
males; humanities: 610 females and 518 males; and STEM: 772 females and 1,086 males.
Working with the information technology services professional staff and with institutional review board
approval and oversight, we obtained email addresses for all third- and fourth-year undergraduate students.
We divided the student sample based on the four broad academic majors and created male and female
subgroups in each category. We then randomized each of the eight subgroups and split them into eight
blocks. We gave each block a different treatment (email message) based on the framework we define in
Table 1. Our factorial design was four major categories x two genders x eight interventions. Table 2 shows
the number of recipients for each of the 64 groups.

Male

Female

Table 2. Breakdown of Recipients Based on Eight Different Phishing Email (7,225 in total)
Field

Gift card

Social science
Business
Humanities
STEM
Social science
Business
Humanities
STEM

224
43
77
97
195
70
65
136
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Tuition
assist.
224
43
76
97
194
69
65
136

iPad

Registration

Firewall

224
43
76
97
195
69
65
136

224
43
77
97
195
70
65
136

224
42
76
96
194
69
65
136

Bank
card
224
42
76
96
194
69
65
136

Volunteer
223
42
76
96
194
69
64
135

Issue 1

Social
network
223
42
76
96
194
69
64
135
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We used an automated email distribution service to distribute the phishing emails. The service allowed us
to track the emails through the entire phishing process; that is, when users received the email, when they
read it, and when they clicked on the phishing link. The service allowed us to create accounts (with arbitrary
client addresses) from which we distributed the emails. We created email addresses with the university’s
“edu” domain extension to imply authenticity and increase the users’ trust in the email (i.e., if the user
hovered the mouse over the sender’s name, it would show an email with “albany.edu” extension, such as
itm_maillist1@albany.edu). This technique mimics sophisticated phishing strategies currently in use. To
comply with the service’s usage policy, we added an unsubscribe message to the bottom of the email, which
constituted a single line of text with a link to the email address of the account from which the email was sent.
Each email contained a fake phishing link, which was actually a link to the participant survey. Each link
uniquely corresponded to a different email so that we could aggregate the responses to specific email
accounts. We masked the survey links using a different service to hide the true identity of the link. To make
the links more convincing, we used a link that included both the word “ualbany” and a word related to the
specific phishing email (e.g., “giftcardsurvey”) (e.g., http://ualbany.9nl.com/giftcardsurvey/).
We considered the timing for the experiment carefully because we needed to choose a time that students
would most likely check and read their emails. We collected data for 15 days, starting from the last week of
classes to end of final examinations to make sure that most of the students saw the emails (Ferguson,
2005). We tracked the number of recipients who opened the phishing emails and the number of users out
of the ones who opened the email who actually clicked on the phishing link embedded in the email. Once a
user clicked the phishing link, the link directed the user to the survey website. This website contained an
informational page that informed the user of the phishing experiment and provided tips for good practices
to avoid phishing (Appendix 2).

4.1

Participant Survey

Via the survey website, we asked participants who clicked on the link to complete a survey at the end of the
informational message to obtain data on users’ perceptions and individual differences. Only a small fraction
of students actually completed the survey, so we treated these data as exploratory. The survey
questionnaire assessed users’ computer security, their perceptions and scrutiny of the email, and
personality traits. We asked participants whether they had a firewall and/or a virus protection program
running on their computer (response options were “yes”, “no”, and “I don’t know”). We also asked them how
many times their computer had been infected with a virus or malware in the past. Four questions assessed
security and anti-phishing behaviors related to the phishing email. We asked participants if they scrolled
over the link in the email before clicking on it and whether they searched for information on the topic before
responding (response options were “yes” and “no”). We also asked them how suspicious they were of the
email on a four-point Likert scale (1 = not at all suspicious, 2 = a little suspicious, 3 = fairly suspicious, 4 =
very suspicious). We also asked them if they read the email carefully on a four-point Likert scale (1 = not
very carefully at all, 2 = somewhat carefully, 3 = carefully, 4 = very carefully). We measured the personality
traits conscientiousness, neuroticism (emotional stability), extraversion, ambition, and achievement drive
using a self-report, commercial personality inventory. We assessed the reliability for these scales using
Cronbach’s alpha and found them to be acceptable for each scale: .79 for conscientiousness, .96 for
extraversion, .91 for neuroticism, .72 for ambition, and .73 for achievement drive.

5

Results

A total of 7,225 phishing emails were sent to students and registered as received. Records showed that
1,975 students opened the email that they received, resulting in an “open” rate of 27.3 percent. Further, 964
students clicked on the link embedded in the phishing message, resulting in a “click” rate of 13.3 percent.
Thus, over a quarter of those students who received a phishing message opened it, and nearly a half (48.8
percent) of those who opened the email went further and clicked on the link embedded in the phishing
message.

5.1
5.1.1

Comparisons between Message Conditions
Manipulation Checks

We could not test the effectiveness of our manipulation in the study sample because we only had access to
participants who we deceived and who volunteered to complete the survey after following the email links.
Thus, we conducted a post-hoc manipulation check study using a separate sample of students from the
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same university. We gave 238 students one of the eight email scenarios and asked them to rate the outcome
described in the scenario on the extent to which it described an outcome that was positive or negative as
they assessed it and whether it presented the opportunity to gain or lose something. Participants responded
on nine-point semantic differential scales, with the poles of the scales anchored at negative (1) vs. positive
(9) outcome and opportunity to lose (1) vs. opportunity to gain (9) something. Table 3 presents the results.
Overall, the participants rated the gain conditions as more positive (Ms = 6.06 vs. 4.64), t(236) = 4.39, p <
.01) and as having a greater opportunity for gain (Ms = 6.13 vs. 4.8), t(236) = 3.82, p < .01) than the loss
conditions. However, we did not successfully manipulate all of the specific loss conditions. The participants
clearly saw the bank card and course registrations as losses and negatively framed, but they did not see
the tuition and alumni network conditions as losses and negatively framed. We negatively framed the latter
two conditions as presenting the loss of an opportunity, but students did not interpret this frame as a loss.
Rather, students interpreted the tuition assistance condition and alumni network conditions as more of a
gain than loss opportunity. We also asked participants how motivated they would be to receive the outcome
depicted in the email and how much they valued the outcome. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
revealed no significant difference in motivation between the email conditions (F(7,230) = 2.0, p > .05). This
finding suggests that any differences in susceptibility were not due to differences in motivation to pursue the
outcome. The results of our manipulation checks suggest that the most appropriate statistical design was
to compare the eight email conditions in a single-factor design.
Table 3. Results of Post-hoc Manipulation Checks

5.1.2

Condition

Positive (9) vs.
negative (1) outcome

Gain (9) vs.
loss (1)

Motivational
value

Gift card
iPad Mini
Virus & firewall software
Volunteer
Course registration
Bank card
Tuition assistance
Alumni social network

7.28
6.37
5.18
5.24
2.64
3.89
6.47
5.77

7.41
6.20
5.11
5.62
2.82
4.07
6.25
6.23

4.47
3.87
3.79
3.59
4.67
4.44
4.14
3.84

Test of Hypotheses

Analyses examined differences in recipients’ responses to the phishing messages. Table 4 presents the
frequency with which recipients opened the different emails and clicked on the link embedded in the phishing
messages. We found vast differences between message conditions for both open and click rates. The
percent of recipients opening the email message ranged from a low of 1.9 percent for the bank card fraud
email to a high of 54.4 percent for the course registration message. A chi-square test revealed significant
differences between the eight email conditions (2(8) = 617.0, p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons revealed
the following pattern for frequency of opening the email: course registration message > tuition assistance
and free gift card > free iPad and free computer fire wall > volunteer opportunity > alumni network and bank
card fraud (all ps < .05). The finding that over half of recipients (54 percent) opened the course registration
message supports Hypothesis 1, which suggests that highly contextualized emails capture recipients’
attention. In fact, the two messages that produced the highest number of email openings related to salient
concerns for most students: keeping course registrations open and tuition assistance. We also
contextualized the firewall, alumni network, and bank card conditions in that they were ostensibly sent from
university officials and related to student concerns. These messages, however, did not lead to high open
rates. Course registrations and tuition are likely to be more salient and important to college students and,
hence, more likely to draw their attention. The high open rate for the course registration condition is also
consistent with Hypothesis 2 (loss frames result in higher susceptibility than gain frames), but the open rate
in the bank card condition, the only other loss condition identified by the manipulation check analysis, was
very low. Overall, the average open rate in loss frames did not differ from that in gain frames.
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, messages that related to protecting assets (registrations and computer) or
acquiring valued things or resources (iPad, gift card, and money for tuition) were likely to induce recipients
to open the email messages. Messages related to social motives (volunteering and networking) were less
effective. For the most part, recipients ignored the bank card protection message because, perhaps, they
were familiar with similar messages and recognized them as fraudulent.
Table 4. Frequency of Opening Email and Clicking on Link by Message Condition
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Gift
card
907
345d
38%
194b
21.4%

N
# open
% open
# click
% click

Tuition
assist.
907
357d
39%
187b
20.6%

iPad

Registration

Firewall

905
291c
32.1%
178b
19.7%

904
492e
54.4%
338c
37.3%

902
269c
29.8%
40a
4.4%

Bank
card
902
17a
1.9%
3a
< 1%

Social
network
899
19a
2.1%
4a
< 1%

Volunteer
899
185b
20.6%
20a
2.2%

Note: Means with different subscripts in rows are significantly different (p < .05).

Results for the frequency with which recipients clicked on the embedded link in the email messages mirrored
the results for opening the email. The chi-square analysis revealed significant differences between the eight
conditions (2(5) = 560.8, p < .001), with the highest click rate (37.3 percent) found for the course registration
message, and the lowest rate (< 1 percent) found for the bank card and social network messages. Post hoc
comparisons found that the course registration message produced higher click rates than the iPad, gift card,
and tuition assistance messages, which did not differ from each other but produced significantly more clicks
than did the other four conditions (ps < .01).

5.2

Individual Differences: Gender and Major

Additional analyses examined open and click rates by major and gender across the eight message
conditions. We found a main effect for gender: collapsing across all eight message conditions, females were
more likely to open the email message than males; 29.9 percent of females (n = 1,051) opened their
message compared to 24.4 percent of males ((n = 924), 2(1) = 22.95, p < .01). However, the difference in
click rates between males and females was not statistically significant (p < .05), with 14.1 percent of females
(n = 495) clicking on the link versus 12.6 percent of males ((n = 469), 2(1) = 3.36, p = .067). We conducted
post hoc analyses to examine gender differences in open rates in each message condition. Using a
Bonferonni adjusted p-value of .006 (for eight post-hoc tests), we found significant gender differences in
open rates for the gift card and course registration conditions. As Table 5 shows, women were significantly
more likely than men to open the gift card (44 percent vs. 32 percent; 2(1) = 13.5, p < .01) and course
registration (60 percent vs. 49 percent; 2(1) = 11.6, p < .01) emails. Gender differences in the other
conditions were not significant. Thus, the effect of gender on open rates was restricted to the iPad and
course registration conditions.
Table 5. Open Rates by Message Condition and Participant Gender
Gift
card

Tuition
assist.

iPad

Registration

Firewall

Bank
card

Volunteer

Social
network

Female

44.1%

41.7%

33.4%

60.2%

32.6%

1.8%

23.3%

1.8%

Male

32.3%

37.1%

31.2%

48.9%

27.2%

1.9%

18.0%

2.4%

Chi square tests also revealed a significant main effect of academic major on the frequency of opening the
email (2(3) = 12.40, p < .01). Table 6 presents the frequency of openings and link clicks by student major,
collapsed across all message conditions. Post-hoc comparisons revealed that business and social science
majors were more likely to open the email than humanities majors. No other comparisons were statistically
significant (p < .05). Analyses revealed no significant differences between majors in terms of click rate (2(3)
= 5.42, p =.14).
Table 6. Frequency of Opening Email and Clicking on Link by Major, Collapsed Across Message Conditions

# open
% open
# click
% click

Social science

Business

Humanities

STEM

931
27.8%
466
13.9%

274
30.6%
112
12.5%

269
23.8%
130
11.5%

501
27.0%
256
13.8%

We conducted log-linear analyses to test for higher-order interactions between condition, gender, major,
and click and open rates. Results showed no significant gender x condition, major x condition, or gender x
major x condition interaction terms for either click or open rates.
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Survey Responses

Of the 964 students who clicked on the link in the email, 206 (21.4 percent) completed the survey on the
landing webpage. There were not enough responses in each experimental condition to conduct
comprehensive analyses, but we present the following results for informational purposes. Respondents
reported being moderately suspicious of the email that they received (mean rating = 2.4 on a 1-4 scale) and
being moderately careful in reading the email (mean rating = 2.6 on a 1-4 scale). There were no gender
differences in reported suspicion or care, and having a firewall or virus protection did not affect suspicion or
carefulness. A majority (59.2 percent) of respondents reported scrolling over the link before clicking on it,
and 22.4 percent reported that they searched for information on sender before clicking.
We analyzed suspicion ratings for experimental conditions with more than 10 respondents. ANOVA revealed
main effects of condition for suspicion and carefulness in reading email (Fs (3,187) = 8.02 and 5.77,
respectively, ps < .01). Post-hoc tests revealed that respondents in the gift card and tuition assistance
conditions were less suspicious and read the email less carefully than those in the free iPad condition (ps
< .05), while those in the course registration condition fell between these two groups. The only other
significant effect was a main effect of condition on conscientiousness (F(3, 133) = 2.68, p = .05).
Respondents in the registration and tuition assistance conditions were higher in conscientiousness than
respondents in the iPad and gift card conditions, but post-hoc tests between conditions failed to reach
statistical significance (p < .05) when we used the Tukey correction for the number of post-hoc comparisons.
The trait of conscientiousness was positively correlated with being suspicious (r = .25) and carefully reading
the message (r = .21, ps <.05). These findings are consistent with the behavioral tendencies of
conscientious people to pay close attention to details and to be planful, although the findings could also
reflect a response bias. Finally, individuals reporting themselves to be high in ambition and achievement
striving also reported being more suspicious of the emails (rs = .22 and .23, respectively, p < .05).

6

Discussion

In this study, we examine the impact of the content and framing of phishing emails on user vulnerability.
Results suggest that the desire to protect things of value and the opportunity to obtain valued objects are
motives that make people susceptible to phishing scams. Further, messages that targeted issues and
concerns relevant to the student sample (e.g., course registration and tuition assistance) were most
successful (i.e., in convincing the participants to click the link in the email).

6.1

Analysis of Hypotheses

In partial support of Hypothesis 1, student participants were more susceptible to a highly contextualized
message pertaining to course registrations than to other generic messages. The threat of losing course
registrations spurred over half of recipients to open a fraudulent email message, and over one-third of them
to follow the link embedded in the fraudulent message. Of participants who opened the registration email,
over two-thirds (68.7 percent) clicked on the phishing link. Thus, the contextualized message channeled
recipients through the first two steps of the phishing process and lead them to read the email and click on
the embedded link. This “channeling” of behavior is consistent with the heuristic-systematic model (Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993) in that message cues (e.g., an important matter and a credible sender) can propel people
to act without (or even despite) carefully deliberating on the consequences of their actions. We conducted
this study after the advanced registration period for the upcoming semester had closed, a time when
students are likely to be highly motivated to protect their course registrations. The saliency and importance
of course registrations may have lowered the recipients’ sufficiency threshold and caused them to respond
to the link quickly without carefully considering the email’s legitimacy. Additionally, the strongly
contextualized message may have withstood initial scrutiny or skepticism from the individuals’ systematic
processing system. The survey responses suggest that this may have been the case because respondents
receiving the course registration email indicated they were moderately suspicious of the email but still
clicked on the link. Luo et al. (2013) suggest that the most effective phishing messages would be those that
can operate on both the heuristic and systematic processing systems. The threat of losing course
registrations may have lowered the sufficiency threshold in students and pushed them toward quick action,
while the rich context cues may have convinced those scrutinizing the message that it was authentic. The
second most clicked link (tuition assistance) was also high in contextualization, which further suggests that
a personalized context increases susceptibility to phishing. The extreme version of contextualization is a
spear-phishing attack that appears to come from someone known to the victim and that addresses the victim
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by name. The results of spear-phishing studies are similar to ours. Halevi et al. (2015) found that 25 of 40
employees (62.5%) clicked on a link embedded in a fraudulent email purportedly from the company’s IT
manager and addressed to them individually. Our results suggest that phishing messages need not be
personalized to that extent in order to be effective.
Hypothesis 2 states that loss frames increase susceptibility compared to gain frames. The results suggest
that this effect may only be true for highly contextualized messages, such as the course registration email.
The manipulation check analysis indicated that the only other condition that the participants interpreted as
a loss frame was the bank card condition, which resulted in low open and click rates. Although the second
most successful message threatened students with the loss of an opportunity for tuition assistance, the
manipulation check analyses indicated that students were more likely to adopt a gain frame than a loss
frame for this message.
The results also showed that the chance to acquire free goods (an iPad or gift card) increased vulnerability
to phishing attacks. One in five students who received a message promising a gift card or an iPad visited
the phishing website and, thus, put themselves at risk for being scammed or having the security of their
computer and data compromised. This finding is consistent with the drive to acquire that Lawrence and
Nohria (2002) identify as a universal emotional need in humans. The lure of “free” goods may lower the
sufficiency threshold in recipients and cause them to respond in heuristic processing mode and overlook
the risks associated with phishing emails. Some evidence from the post-study survey supports this
explanation; respondents reported being least careful when reading the gift card message.
Participants were less susceptible to the phishing messages geared toward social outcomes (altruism and
social networks) than for material outcomes. Perhaps these messages were not as believable, or
participants were not highly motivated to pursue the social outcomes offered by the phishing message.
University students have numerous opportunities to assist others and participate in social activities and
networks, which may have reduced the attractiveness of this opportunity.

6.2

Individual Differences

We also examined how vulnerabilities change across different student populations based on academic
major and gender. Previous research suggests that women are more susceptible to phishing than men (e.g.,
Halevi et al., 2013; 2015; Jagatic et al., 2007). We found that women were more likely than men to open
phishing messages but not necessarily more likely to click on the embedded links. Perhaps women are
more easily enticed to look at phishing emails (step 1 of the phishing process) but are as adept as men at
detecting deceptive messaging (step 2). Likewise, business majors were more likely than humanities majors
to open emails, although we found no differences in click rates by type of major. A possible explanation for
this finding is that the business major at the university is very competitive and attracts highly motivated and
engaged students, who may also be more diligent in monitoring and responding to emails linked to the
university.

6.3

New Contributions

This study provides several important contributions to information security research. It clearly demonstrates
that situational or contextual factors alter the effectiveness of phishing attempts. Users’ or recipients’
responses are rooted in their perceptions of risk and reward when confronted with a decision choice.
Cognitive biases and heuristics, however, may reduce rational logic and increase vulnerability to fraudulent
messages. Contextualized social engineering attacks, such as emails to students that threaten the loss of
academic registrations, may cause them to overlook cues of deception that they might normally catch. The
findings also lend support to the heuristic-systematic processing model (HSM). A contextualized message
that threatens the loss of something valuable may be especially likely to prompt people to act quickly without
carefully considering the potential consequences of the action. The fear associated with the anticipated loss
of something valuable may increase reliance on heuristics and automatic responses (Damasio, 1984;
LeDoux, 2003). However, should initial suspicion cause recipients to more systematically process a
message, the rich context of the message may convince them that the message is legitimate. The survey
results support this assertion by showing that respondents who clicked on the embedded link were
moderately suspicious of the email but clicked on the link nonetheless. Perhaps the emotion elicited by the
message—the anticipation of gaining or losing something valuable—lowered the user’s sufficiency
threshold for responding or influenced their appraisal of the legitimacy of the message.
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The survey results also suggest that students may be aware of common phishing detection methods. Nearly
60 percent of those who completed the survey reported that they scrolled over the link in the email, and 22
percent reported that they searched for information on the Internet before clicking the link. It is difficult to
draw firm conclusions from these findings because of the low response rate and because we cannot
determine the veracity of responses, but the findings may indicate that young adults are aware of techniques
to detect and protect against phishing. However, the study also shows that contextualized messages that
mask URLs and other cues can still channel users toward fraudulent websites.
The vast difference we found in open and click rates is also noteworthy. Although the most influential email
threatened the loss of something (course registration), so too did the least influential message (bank card
fraud). Perhaps the latter email was less believable to students because it resembled common or known
phishing attempts. The university’s website, for example, presents an example of a phishing email that asks
for bank information. Thus, the bank card message was similar to common phishing attempts; students may
have rejected it as a common scam.

6.4

Training Implications

As the literature illustrates, past training has not been very effective, which we posit may be due to the vast
array of techniques of deception (in phishing) and human cognitive limitation to process and absorb them.
Creating highly focused and contextualized awareness campaigns targeted to different audiences based on
their cognitive biases may improve the impact of the training provided. Given that students take emails from
university administration (e.g., accounts, scholarships, etc.) and instructors (e.g., grades, assignments, and
plagiarism etc.) seriously, such interventions would help provide students with ways to distinguish legitimate
from illegitimate emails. Many methods exist to do so, such as: 1) ensuring that all emails come from
university email addresses and that all of the links in the email start with the university domain, 2) providing
a procedure for students to verify the authenticity of the email either by phone or the Web, and 3) educating
students on the importance of verifying emails, especially those that request sensitive information.
Additionally, given that financial incentives, even if relatively small (e.g., gift card), strongly motivate students
to respond, we could educate students on ways to determine the legitimacy of offers. To create
contextualized strategies, we need to understand the psychological traits of specific demographics and
create appropriate messages to neutralize individual vulnerabilities.
Phishing is fundamentally a human problem, and education is a critical tool to reduce susceptibility (Jagatic
et al., 2007). Anti-phishing training has been ineffective, and poor training results have led some researchers
to go so far as to claim that users cannot be trusted to make rational security decisions and that those
decisions should be taken out of their hands and made automatically for effective security (Görling, 2006).
The conjecture that we draw from our research is that targeted training based on specific biases that
increase phishing susceptibility would be effective. For example, to guard against biases that stem from
heuristic processing, training might seek ways to raise the sufficiency threshold in recipients and, thereby,
increase the chances that users will systematically process messages. Training also needs to counter the
effects of pretexting and contextualization. It may be difficult to prevent pretexting, but users can be provided
with techniques for verifying authenticity of internal communications, and organizations should develop clear
policies about the types of information that might be requested of its members (e.g., “We will never ask for
your password, ever”). Our future research will entail incorporating good practices based on learning science
principles that are contextualized according to user motivation and psychological biases.

6.5

Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations. We did not ask students for personal information or data and, thus, do
not know if students would have been deceived into divulging sensitive or confidential information. This is
the critical third step of the phishing sequence, where users provide personal information after opening and
reading the email and clicking on an embedded link. We need more research to examine vulnerability at
this third stage. Nonetheless, clicking on links in emails (step 2) increases vulnerability because doing so
may automatically download and install malware on the user’s computer. Links can be associated with
downloads of executable files that can install trojans on the user’s computer without their knowledge. The
participants in this study were students enrolled in a U.S. university, and users in different countries and
from different cultures may behave differently in regards to phishing (Flores et al., 2015; Tembe, et al.,
2014). The study focuses on general phishing attacks via emails and does not address spear phishing or
phishing through different channels such as online social media platforms. Further research should
investigate whether the effects of contextualized messages generalize to these other forms of phishing.
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Finally, we did not have a fully balanced experimental design and our manipulation of gain/loss frame was
only partly successful. However, comparisons between the eight scenarios provide insights into the effects
of contextualization and framing. Future research should expand on our findings and test the effects of
different scenarios in experimental settings.

7

Conclusions

We tested the premise that successful phishing attacks take advantage of the human tendency to make
quick intuitive judgments based on initial impressions of the immediate context. We tested the assertion that
susceptibility to phishing is strongly associated with the contextual setting of a phishing email via an
experiment with emails framed based on our hypotheses to elicit user reaction. We found that the context
of the email was strongly related to susceptibility to phishing and that different demographics were
associated with susceptibility. The research implies the need for developing context-based education to
help users detect phishing emails as an effective counter to the increasing design sophistication of phishing
attacks. It also illustrates, based on rate of email opening, differences in susceptibility of different users for
specific demographics features (e.g., major and gender). This finding suggests the need to identify the
precise vulnerabilities based on demographic groups and provide targeted education designed for each
group. In the future, we would like to examine the impact of such targeted education on reducing users’
susceptibility to phishing.
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Appendix A. Email Messages Used in the Experiment
Table A1. Financial Acquisition
Gain

Loss

From: Student Research
Subject: $50 gift card to fill survey

From: Financial Management
Subject: RIAA Tuition Assistance

Dear Student:

Dear Student:

Receive $50 for completing a short survey! Ludlow
Corporation has been measuring consumers’
attitudes for three decades, and companies rely on
our results to develop and market their products. If
you complete our new survey by MIDNIGHT
TONIGHT, you will receive your choice of a $50 gift
card to Amazon.com or Barnesandnoble.com. Just
click on the link below to complete the survey and tell
us which gift you want and where to send it.

Recording Association of America has provided
2000 tuition relief vouchers of $300 for students who
sign a pledge to not download music illegally from
the Internet. This has been provided since your
University was able to successfully implement a
program to curb illegal download of music from the
web. The vouchers are first come first serve until
they last. You must act quickly before they run out.
Please click on the link below and provide your
personal information.

http://ualbany.9nl.com/giftcardsurvey/
http://ualbany.9nl.com/tuitionrelief/
Best Regards,Kevin Peterson
Ludlow Corporation

Best Regards,
Kevin Peterson
Asst VP, Financial Management

Table A2. Non-financial Acquisition / Goods
Gain

Loss

From: Apple Research Team
Subject: Get a free iPad mini for giving it a test
drive

From: Legal Affairs
Subject: Action Needed to Keep your Registration
Open

Dear Student:

Dear student:

You’ve won an iPad mini! Apple is distributing its
new mini tablet to select university students who are
willing to help evaluate it. The tablet has the same
capabilities as an iPad with a smaller screen. In
return for the free tablet all we will request is for you
to provide us feedback on the product every two
weeks. You will be provided a template to fill out
your experiences with the tablet. Apple is an equal
opportunity company and you were randomly
selected without any cultural or racial bias. Please
register at the following link and make sure that you
accept the terms and conditions at the end of the
form.

The University takes its legal responsibility seriously
and is very concerned about illegal download of
music on campus. We have been singled out by
RIAA as one of the most prolific abusers of illegal
music downloads. You have yet to complete the
illegal downloading pledge, which the University
requires. If you do not complete the form, you will
have a block on your registration and will not be able
to sign up for courses during the pre-registration
period. Please click on the link below to complete the
form.

http://ualbany.9nl.com/ipadmini/

Sincerely,

Best Wishes,
Apple Research Team

Kevin Peterson
Legal Affairs
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Table A3. Security
Gain

Loss

From: Admin
Subject: Students - protect your computer with a free
firewall

From: Student Accounts
Subject: Student Bank Card Fraud Prevention
Dear Student:

Dear Student:
The University takes its information security very
seriously and is concerned about the recent spate of
cyber attacks on computers within the University. We
would like to ensure that all student computers are
secure. Any virus infection on your computer can get
transmitted to the University network. We have
decided to provide students with a firewall program to
install on your computers. Please download the
firewall on your computer. It is a simple one step
process that will add to your security as well as that
of the University. Please download the firewall
software as soon as you can. This service will not cost
you anything.

There have been cyber attacks at several banks that
manage visa, master and debit card transactions for
online purchases. The attacks have been going on
since March of this year but were discovered earlier
this month. We suspect that several million bank or
credit card numbers have been compromised. If you
have used your card for online purchases in the U.S.
this year your account may have been compromised.
The easiest way to see if your account has been
compromised is to click the following link. If your card
has been compromised you should call your bank and
request a new one immediately.

http://ualbany.9nl.com/FraudPrevention/

http://ualbany.9nl.com/studentsoftware/

Sincerely,

Best regards,

The Student Support Office

The Information Security Office

Table A4. Social
Gain (rewards of altruism)

Loss (potential networks)

From: USA Aid Rescue Organization
Subject: Volunteers needed!

From: Name: Alumni Network
Subject: UAlbany Friends Network

Hi!

Dear User:

Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy have caused significant
devastation in the Gulf Coast and Atlantic Coast
regions. Thousands of people have lost everything
and have become homeless. The initial response by
Americans was outstanding, but these people still
need help. Efforts by Red Cross are limited to
emergency help. Please make a donation of time or
money at the following link. People need our help!

Don’t be left friend-less – act now to maintain
membership in alumni networks. Your alumni network
has established an account for you in their rapidly
growing social connections with influential alumni.
This network will provide access to internships in all
fields of study, as well as to high paying jobs. You
must confirm your account or it will be deleted. Click
the following link to confirm your personal information
and to retain your membership account.

http://ualbany.9nl.com/volunteer/
http://ualbany.9nl.com/UaNetwork/
Kindly,
Sincerely,
USA Aid Rescue Organization
Kevin Peterson
Alumni Network Coordinator
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Appendix B. Informational Message
You've Been Phished!
Dear Student:
This was an email to test whether or not you would click on a Phishing link. Fortunately, this is only a test and no harm
was done to your computer or you. If this had been a real email, you could have become a victim of Phishing. Our
goal is to educate students on the dangers of Phishing such that do not become victims of identity theft.
This study is completely anonymous and we do not know who you are. Even some of the most technologically savvy
people become victims of such phishing attacks. We will invite you to participate in a short survey study that asks your
perceptions of phishing messages. But first, we want to give you some tips to avoid getting phished. Even if you
decide not to take our survey, please pay attention to these tips:
1. No legitimate firm is going to ask you for account information, passwords, verification of security questions or other
sensitive information.
2. Even if the email address seems to be from a legitimate company you conduct business with it could still be a
phishing email with the real address camouflaged. If the email seems suspicious, instead of replying to the email, call
the customer service
3. Be especially wary of emails warning you about security breaches and account compromises asking you to provide
detailed account information – these are phishing scams
4. Be extra careful of misspelled names e.g., allbany.edu instead of albany.edu or R0gers.com instead of
Rogers.com. Check for the name of the company on the Internet.
If you do get phished the hacker may attempt to commit credit card fraud, bank fraud or identity theft. For such
scenarios you need to take the following steps:
I. CREDIT/ATM CARD FRAUD
a) Report the theft of information to the credit card company and cancel your current card
b) Check your credit card statement to see if there are transactions you do not recognize
c) Report any unauthorized transactions to the credit card company (your liability is limited to $50)
d) Report any unauthorized transactions on your debit/ATM card within 60 days of receiving the statement (if you
report within 60 days your liability is zero else it is unlimited)
II. BANK ACCOUNT THEFT
a) Call your affected financial institution to report the loss right away.
b) Cancel your account and open a new one.
III. IDENTITY THEFT
a) Request credit reports from the three agencies to see if any fake accounts have been opened on your behalf. If true
request the malicious activity be removed from your records and a victim’s statement be placed on record
b) File criminal report with your local police
c) Report theft to the Social Security Administration's Fraud Hotline
d) Alert passport office to ensure that a passport is not ordered in your name
e) File a complaint to the Internet Fraud Office
To help us improve the security at the University we will appreciate if you could take a short anonymous survey that
pertains to your perceptions about risk.
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